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Liability of Liquor Vendors for Injuries to Intoxicated Persons
Kemock v. Mark I1, 62 Ohio App. 2d 103, 404 N.E.2d 766 (1978)
N AN OPINION anticipating, in part, the advent of the comparative negli-
gence standard in Ohio, Kemock v. Mark I1 extends common law liability
to include liquor vendors who serve already intoxicated patrons who injure
themselves and whose injury is the proximate result of continued alcohol
consumption. Relying upon an earlier Ohio Supreme Court decision2 and
a California Supreme Court case,3 the Court of Appeals of Ohio recognizes
liability for vendor negligence which damages the drinker. The test for re-
covery is one not previously applied in cases of this sort in Ohio; one
which measures liability by balancing degrees of each party's negligence,
not unlike comparative negligence.'
Kemock recounts Timothy Woernley's last evening, the suit being brought
on behalf of his estate. Woermley arrived at The Mark H lounge to drink,
visit and to watch his former brother-in-law, Richard Samples, perform.
He had not been drinking before his first round at the lounge, but once
there he drank virtually continuously for two and one-half hours.
Samples, during a break, observed that plaintiff's-decedent had become
intoxicated and brought him some coffee, noticing then that Woernley
had been served a fresh drink. Because he felt Woemley was too drunk
to drive, Samples took away his car keys and called Woernley's brother-in-
law to come to The Mark II and drive Woernley home. Angered at seeing
him in the lounge, Woernley attacked the brother-in-law and went "just out
of his head."' Ultimately, Woernley "raised so much cain" that Samples
returned Woernley's car keys. Plaintiff's-decedent had had approximately
twelve drinks in three hours when he squealed out of The Mark II parking
lot.
On his way to his parents' house, Woernley was observed doing 61
162 Ohio App. 2d 103, 404 N.E.2d 766 (1978).
2 Mason v. Roberts, 33 Ohio St. 2d 29, 294 N.E.2d 884 (1973).
a Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978).
4 The court expressly rejects plaintiff's theory of comparative negligence, finding itself an
inappropriate forum for a shift to such a standard. 62 Ohio App. 2d at 109-10, 404 N.E.2d
at 771. The decision does, however, move beyond the theory that contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff wholly bars recovery by presenting a degrees of negligence test.
This approach weighs the negligence of each party and the one most negligent bears the
entire burden of the plaintiff's damages. Under the current comparative negligence statute,
damages are apportioned in relation to the amount of legal fault. Am. S.B. 165, 1980 Ohio
Legis. Bull. 136 (Anderson) (to be codified at OIno REV. CoDE ANN. § 2315.19).
5 62 Ohio App. 2d at 106, 404 N.E.2d at 769.
Old. at 107, 404 N.E.2d at 770.
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m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone and was pursued by a police officer. Woernley
attempted to elude the officer by accelerating his speed and making an
illegal right turn through a red light. He crashed into a tree in the yard
neighboring his parents' home and died at the hospital.
Plaintiff's complaint in this wrongful death action alleges that the de-
fendant-corporation unlawfully sold alcohol to plaintiff's-decedent so that
Woemley became intoxicated, and continued to serve him when ordinary
care dictated otherwise. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of The
Mark II finding that Woernley's behavior and voluntary intoxication con-
stituted contributory negligence as a matter of law and, therefore, barred
recovery.
The Ohio Civil Damage or Dram Shop Act7 provides no relief for
plaintiffs in similar positions. Recovery is limited to injuries accruing from
actions of persons who are blacklisted by the Ohio Department of Liquor
Control or who are known habitual drinkers. Under this statute, a bar-
tender will be held strictly liable for illegal sales to those within this pro-
tected class. Woernley was neither blacklisted nor a habitual drunkard.
Plaintiffs do find support in the statutes regulating the sale of alcoholic
beverages. In order to state a claim, they may rely on the statute forbidding
continued sale to an intoxicated person.8 Until 1973, however, a liquor
vendor's civil liability was confined to the boundaries of the Dram Shop Act.
Ramon v. Spike9 illustrated this proposition. Ramon involved the statutory
violation of sale of alcohol to a minor" who drank until intoxicated and
then drove his car over a sidewalk injuring the plaintiff. Recovery was
denied because the minor was not on the state's list.
More closely related factually to Kemock, in that the injury occurred
to the drinker, but with the same result was Christofi v. Gradsky.11 Here,
plaintiffs-decedent, Louis Angoff, died of acute alcohol poisoning after
I Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Page 1973) provides:
A husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person injured in person,
property, or means of support by an intoxicated person, or in consequence of the in-
toxication, habitual or otherwise, of a person, after the issuance and during the exist-
ence of the order of the department of liquor control prohibiting the sale of intoxicating
liquor as defined in section 4301.01 of the Revised Code to such: person, has a right of
action in his own name, severally or jointly, against any person selling or giving in-
toxicating liquors which cause such intoxication, in whole or in part, of such person.
8 OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.22 (Page 1973) states:
Sales of beer and intoxicating liquor under all classes of permits and from state liquor
stores are subject to the following restrictions, in addition to those imposed by the
rules, regulations, or orders of the department of liquor control: . . . (B) No sales
shall be made to an intoxicated person.
9 92 Ohio App. 49, 109 N.E.2d 327 (1951).
10 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.22(A) (Page 1973) states: "No beer shall be sold to any
person under eighteen years of age; and no intoxicating liquor shall be sold to or handled
by any person under twenty-one years of age. .... "
11 140 N.E.2d 586 (C.P. Ohio 1956).
Fall, 19801
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 14 [1981], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss2/9
AKRON LAw REviEw
receiving drinks from a bartender while intoxicated. The trial court dis-
missed the case for failure to state a claim, following Ramon, because the
suit alleged only negligence on the defendant's part and no violation of
the Dram Shop Act.
Traditionally, recovery was limited to the parameters of Civil Damage Act
legislation because at common law there existed no liquor vendor liability.
"It was not a tort at common law to sell or give liquor to an 'able-bodied
man.' ,,12 The rationale was that the proximate cause of a drinker's injuries
was the drinking and not the serving. Robinson v. Stilgenbaueri' presented
the first clue that Ohio courts were willing to reject this traditional reasoning.
While the court was unable to do so because of the factual setting of the
case, it did express a desire to move forward in the direction of extending
liability.' "
Mason v. Roberts"5 and Taggart v. Bitzenhofer6 provided the oppor-
tunity for the court to do so. The analysis for both cases, decided the same
day, is found in Mason. The opinion overturned Ramon and Christoff and
clearly stated that the remedy for injuries to bar patrons or those injured by
bar patrons extends beyond the Dram Shop Act. In doing so, the court
first set out the two accepted exceptions to the old common law rule that
only the drinker was liable for his consumption: (1) where a patron was
so inebriated as to make it impossible for him to refuse more alcohol and
the seller knew this, the question of the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury
is for the jury; and, 2) where a vendor, by selling, violated a statute (e.g.,
one prohibiting sale to an intoxicated person) making him negligent per se,
the vendor could be held civilly liable.' To these the Mason court added a
third possibility, one based in standard negligence principles. The court held
that a bar owner owes the duty of reasonable care to his business invitees.
Thus, any forseeable injury resulting to a patron or caused by a patron
may result in liability on the part of the vendor when intoxication is a proxi-
mate cause of that injury."8
Unfortunately, the guidelines set by Mason are unclear. The case dealt
12 Megge v. United States, 344 F.2d 31, 32 (6th Cir. 1965).
is 14 Ohio St. 2d 165, 237 N.E.2d 136 (1968).
14The court stated:
[W]e do not reach the question of law that we believed was involved at the time we
allowed the motion to certify, i.e., whether there may be in this state a cause of action
against a liquor vendor for damages proximately resulting from his negligent sale of
intoxicating beverages to a known habitual drunkard.
Id. at 167, 237 N.E.2d at 138.
15 33 Ohio St. 2d 29, 294 N.E.2d 884.
16 33 Ohio St. 2d 35, 294 N.E.2d 226 (1973).
27 The statute itself imposes only the possibility of criminal sanctions. Omo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 4301.22(B) (Page 1973).
28 33 Ohio St. 2d at 33-34, 294 N.E.2d at 888.
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with the actions of one Robert Lee Rogers known by his bartender to be
violent and disorderly when intoxicated. Roberts assaulted plaintiff's-decedent
outside the bar in which he had been drinking. The court's syllabus, how-
ever, describes the bar owner's duty as being owed to "members of the
public while they are in his place of business."19
Kemock is the first recorded Ohio case of liquor vendor liability to
follow Mason. In choosing to extend liability to cover self-inflicted injuries
sustained by intoxicated drinkers, the court admits that its decision expands
the Mason rule but submits that Mason can be read to support the view
that Ohio recognizes the common law liability of liquor vendors.2" Their
intent to move forward acknowledges the vacuum in this area of Ohio
law.2'
In finding that a cause of action exists, the Kemock court examines
California law, that jurisdiction having run the gamut in this area. Of
particular support is Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl,22 that describes a case of
acute alcohol poisoning which resulted in the death of a twenty-one year
old man. An experienced bartender who was employed by the defendant
served an obviously intoxicated, admittedly inexperienced drinker ten straight
shots of 151 proof rum, as well as other drinks. The alcohol was set before
Ewing continuously even when he was barely awake. Plaintiff's-decedent
eventually slipped into unconsciousness and died with a fatal blood alcohol
level of 0.47.23 The California trial court dismissed the case at the close
of the plaintiff's evidence based on the traditional theory that plaintiff's
contributory negligence in drinking barred recovery. The Supreme Court
of California reversed, acknowledging a cause of action and establishing the
standard for liability followed by Kemock: that a jury may award dam-
ages if the drinker's negligence in drinking is outweighed by any willful
misconduct or negligence on the part of the defendant or his agents. 4
Kemock fully adopts the Ewing test. 5 If both drinker and vendor act
negligently, or if both of the parties' actions typify willful or wanton mis-
19 Id. at 29, 294 N.E.2d at 885. For an expanded discussion of Mason as well as the history
leading to this decision, see Conment, Liquor Vendor Liability for Injuries Caused by In-
toxicated Patrons-A Question of Policy, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 630 (1974) and Note, Common
Law Liability of the Liquor Vendor, 18 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 251 (1966).
2062 Ohio App. 2d at 117 n.10, 404 N.E.2d at 775 n.10.
21 Id. at 112, 404 N.E.2d at 773.
22 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978).
23 20 Cal. 3d at 394, 572 P.2d at 1156, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
24 Id. An earlier case, Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 2d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623
(1971) had extended common law liability principles to suits concerning intoxicated drinkers.
Vesely functioned for Ewing as Mason does for Kemock.
2 The court states that such a step is "consistent with the spirit of Mason v. Roberts." A
footnote in the decision points out the variance in approaches in the United States. 62
Ohio App. 2d at 117 n.10, 404 N.E.2d at 775 n.10.
Fall, 1980]
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 14 [1981], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss2/9
AKRoN LAW REVIEW
conduct," the court will allow no recovery. However, if the defendant is
negligent and the plaintiff reasonable and prudent or if the defendant's
acts amount to willful misconduct when the plaintiff is merely negligent,
the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for his injuries.
A plaintiff seeking recovery must prove all elements of negligence:
a duty of care on the part of the vendor,17 and a breach of that duty which
is the actual and proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Thus the burden
falls on the plaintiff to show that the serving of alcohol to an intoxicated
person or one believed to be intoxicated is the proximate cause of plaintiff's
damage and that such injury was foreseeable by the defendant who either
willfully ignored the danger or negligently failed to prevent it. The syllabus
of the case succinctly presents the proposition as:
Where a business establishment sells alcoholic beverages to one it
knows or has reason to believe is intoxicated, and that person is killed
as a proximate result of his intoxication, such establishment is liable
in damages to the estate of the decedent, unless the deceased exhibited
an absence of care on his own behalf which was equal to or greater
than that of the defendant.2
8
In application, this proposition does not impose an increased chance
of liability on bar owners. Rather than narrowly confining recovery to
innocent, non-drinking plaintiffs who are injured by drinkers, Kemock
simply interprets Mason broadly. The Mason syllabus defines a cause of
action based on the failure to exercise reasonable care with regard to bar
patrons.29 If that duty exists, it exists at all times and a breach of that duty
which results in injury to either patron or bystander opens the door for com-
pensation from the liquor vendor. Thus, while Kemock is the first Ohio
case to plainly state that a cause of action for self-inflicted injury exists,
it merely further defines the duties established by Mason.
Further, the Ohio Dram Shop Act indirectly supports Kemock by in-
dicating a legislative interest in protecting the family whose means of sup-
port is injured as the proximate result of intoxication. Clearly, the Act
confines the actions it grants to families of blacklisted or habitual drinkers,
but the intent to protect these drinkers, unable to protect themselves, is
equally clear. Kemock proceeds in similar fashion by utilizing the common
law.
28 The definition of wanton misconduct adopted in Keniock comes from Hawkins v. Ivy, 50
Ohio St. 2d 114, 363 N.E.2d 367 (1977) and may be stated as follows: failure to exercise
due care "under circumstances in which there is a great probability that harm will result
• ." Id.
27 The duty of reasonable care to business invitees in a bar is established by Mason, see text
supra at note 18.
28 62 Ohio App. 2d at 103, 404 N.E.2d at 767.
29 33 Ohio St. 2d at 29, N.E.2d at 885.
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But when one considers that it dates from 197830 and precedes Ohio's
comparative negligence statute," Kemock's holding that contributory negli-
gence does not bar recovery is seen as a significant departure from estab-
lished Ohio law. The comparative negligence statute now supersedes the
Kemock standard and truly increases chances of recovery. In suits against
bar owners, plaintiffs will always allege negligence per se on the part of the
liquor vendor in continuing service of alcoholic beverages to one who is
intoxicated.3" The plaintiff must prove: 1) that the negligence on the part
of the defendant was greater than any negligence of plaintiff; and, 2) that
the defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff was drunk and
that to continue to serve him drinks created an unreasonable risk of harm
to the plaintiff.
It is always foreseeable that alcohol consumption will lead to changed
behavior. "[I]t is known that the ingestion of alcohol leads to aberrant be-
havior, the nature of which is largely unpredictable."3 The question for
the jury is "How foreseeable is the patron's injury given the state induced by
drinking?" The damage must flow as the natural or probable result of in-
toxication. In cases of alcohol poisoning, no intervening action on the part
of the plaintiff occurs; he simply drinks in full view of the vendor to his
ultimate downfall. Situations in which the plaintiff acts while drunk and
injures himself are more complex. A fact finder must locate the point at
which the plaintiff's negligent actions fall short of any negligence on the
part of the vendor. The point is easily described but difficult in application.
Early cases in other jurisdictions have allowed recovery when the drinker
died of exposure walking home from a bar,34 drowned after falling in a
river while drunk,35 and died when hit by a train while on his way home."0
30The decision was handed down in 1978 but the opinion was not published until 1980.
31The new Osno REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19A(1) provides:
In negligence actions, the contributory negligence of a person does not bar the
person or his legal representative from recovering damages that have directly and
proximately resulted from the negligence of one or more other persons, if the con-
tributory negligence of the person bringing the action was no greater than the com-
bined negligence of all other persons from whom recovery is sought. However, any
damages recoverable by the person bringing the action shall be diminished by an
amount that is proportionately equal to his percentage of negligence ...
32See e.g., Taggart v. Bitzenhofer, 35 Ohio App. 2d 23, 299 N.E.2d 901, (1972) (plaintiff
claiming that he is one of the class of persons protected by that statute), affd, 33 Ohio St.
2d 35, 294 N.E.2d 226 (1973). Interpreting a similar Pennsylvania statute, the court in Schelin
v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958) stated that statutes forbidding the
sale of liquor to intoxicated persons were "enacted to . . . protect specifically intoxicated
persons from their inability to exercise self-protective care." Id. at 348, 146 A.2d at 652.
as Taggart v. Bitzenhofer, 35 Ohio App. 2d 23, 299 N.E.2d 901 (1972), affd, 33 Ohio St. 2d
35, 294 N.E.2d 226 (1973). See generally, Note, New Common Law Dramshop Rule, 9
CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 302 (1960).
34 Curran v. Percival, 21 Neb. 434, 32 N.W. 213 (1887).
5 5Boos v. State, 11 Ind. App. 257, 39 N.E. 197 (1894).
s6 Schroder v. Crawford, 94 Ill. 357 (1880). These and other cases allowed recovery under
the dramshop acts but illustrate what may be viewed as foreseeable injury. For discussion
on recovery under the civil damage acts see, Annot., 64 A.LR. 2d 705 (1959).
Fall, 1980]
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The more plaintiff or forces unrelated to drinking participate in causing
his injury, the less likely is his opportunity for compensation.
The case of Timothy Woernley involves these complexities. Woernley
was able to drive and his doing so constituted negligence per se for driving
while intoxicated." His actions might be considered easily foreseeable, in
that it is "common knowledge that great numbers of persons drive auto-
mobiles while intoxicated and that it is well within the realm of possibility
that one illegally served with intoxicants might negligently drive an auto-
mobile and cause injury to persons or property.""8 One could find The
Mark H liable for serving an intoxicated patron who drives away and in-
jures himself given the theory that drunk driving is foreseeable." While
the question for the jury remains the same, that is, who is most negligent
in the face of foreseeable risk, the factors that complicate the answer are
potentially limitless.
CONCLUSION
The case of Kemock v. Mark II serves to expand liquor vendor liability
in a direction consonant with decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court. Kemock
allows recovery to patrons injured as a result of the continued service of
liquor based on the theory that bartenders owe their clientele a duty of
reasonable care and must protect them from foreseeable risks.
A determination of liability is a jury decision and must apply the
standard of comparative negligence. Thus, an intoxicated patron may re-
cover for an injury which he helped to bring about when the actions of the
vendor in continuing to serve the drinker outweigh any negligence of the
plaintiff.
ELINORE MARSH
s7 OIo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Page 1973) states that "No person who is under the
influence of alcohol . . . shall operate any vehicle . .. ."
38 McKinney v. Foster, 341 Pa. 221, 225, 137 A.2d 502, 504 (1958).
31 In fact, The Mark H was absolved of liability because the court found that Woernley's
driving at excessive speeds and his attempt to elude the police officer who chased him in-
dicated Woernley's ability to control the car. Thus, the court's conclusion was that the
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